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Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 227 — Discharge of Accused — Principles for deciding discharge application — Standard of proof for framing charge — The Court, at the stage of framing charge, must sift the evidence to determine if there is a “sufficient ground for proceeding”; a prima facie case must be established — If two views are possible and one gives rise to “suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion,” the trial Judge is empowered to discharge the accused — The Judge is not a “mere post office” but must exercise judicial mind to determine if a case for trial is made out — The strong suspicion required to frame a charge must be founded on material that can be translated into evidence at trial — Where the profile of allegations renders the existence of strong suspicion patently absurd or inherently improbable, the accused should be discharged. (Paras 14, 15, 16, 17) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 321 — Withdrawal from prosecution — Requirement of High Court permission for withdrawal of cases against sitting or former MPs/MLAs — Following Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India — High Court must exercise judicial mind and give a reasoned order when considering an application for permission to withdraw prosecution against sitting/former legislators — Application must disclose reasons for withdrawal and records of the case must be before the High Court — Absence of requisite permission from the High Court means that the withdrawal application cannot be granted and the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed on this ground — High Court’s rejection of quashing petition confirmed. (Paras 2, 7, 9, 10) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Inherent powers of High Court — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings — Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 — Sections 420 (Cheating), 344 (Wrongful confinement for ten or more days), and 506 (Criminal intimidation) — Scope of quashing power: Quashing under Section 482 CrPC must be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and only in exceptional situations; court must avoid delving into disputed facts at the pre-trial stage — Interference is warranted only when the case falls within recognized parameters (like those in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) — Where allegations in FIR and charge sheet, corroborated by witness statements, prima facie disclose essential ingredients of offences under Sections 420, 344, and 506 IPC, quashing is unwarranted. (Paras 12, 18, 20, 23, 25, 30, 32, 34) Service Law — Termination of Contractual Service — Qualifications — Interpretation of Educational Qualifications — Advertisement requiring “Postgraduate degree in Statistics” — Appellant holding M.Com. degree with Business Statistics and Indian Economic Statistics as principal subjects — Where no Government university offers a degree exclusively titled “Postgraduate degree in Statistics,” insisting solely on the title of the degree, without considering the actual curriculum, amounts to elevating form over substance — The interpretation must be contextual and purposive — Termination based solely on the title of the degree, ignoring expert opinion (Director, W.S.O., S.W.M., P.H.E.D.) that the appellant meets the requirement and the University certificate confirming inclusion of Statistics as principal subjects, is arbitrary and unreasonable. (Paras 3, 4, 31, 32, 37, 44) Contempt of Court — Initiating contempt proceedings — Clear and unequivocal terms of the underlying order — A Contempt Petition can be dismissed summarily only if the underlying order, the non-compliance of which is alleged, is genuinely unclear, ambiguous, or susceptible to two equally reasonable interpretations — Where the High Court dismissed a Contempt Petition holding that the underlying order was capable of two interpretations, but the Supreme Court found, upon reading the order as a whole, that there were clear and categorical directions and recorded statements regarding handing over of possession and payment of compensation, the dismissal of the Contempt Petition was erroneous. (Paras 1, 7, 8, 9, 10)

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 227 — Discharge of Accused — Principles for deciding discharge application — Standard of proof for framing charge — The Court, at the stage of framing charge, must sift the evidence to determine if there is a “sufficient ground for proceeding”; a prima facie case must be established — If two views are possible and one gives rise to “suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion,” the trial Judge is empowered to discharge the accused — The Judge is not a “mere post office” but must exercise judicial mind to determine if a case for trial is made out — The strong suspicion required to frame a charge must be founded on material that can be translated into evidence at trial — Where the profile of allegations renders the existence of strong suspicion patently absurd or inherently improbable, the accused should be discharged. (Paras 14, 15, 16, 17)

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 321 — Withdrawal from prosecution — Requirement of High Court permission for withdrawal of cases against sitting or former MPs/MLAs — Following Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India — High Court must exercise judicial mind and give a reasoned order when considering an application for permission to withdraw prosecution against sitting/former legislators — Application must disclose reasons for withdrawal and records of the case must be before the High Court — Absence of requisite permission from the High Court means that the withdrawal application cannot be granted and the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed on this ground — High Court’s rejection of quashing petition confirmed. (Paras 2, 7, 9, 10)

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 227 — Discharge of Accused — Principles for deciding discharge application — Standard of proof for framing charge — The Court, at the stage of framing charge, must sift the evidence to determine if there is a “sufficient ground for proceeding”; a prima facie case must be established — If two views are possible and one gives rise to “suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion,” the trial Judge is empowered to discharge the accused — The Judge is not a “mere post office” but must exercise judicial mind to determine if a case for trial is made out — The strong suspicion required to frame a charge must be founded on material that can be translated into evidence at trial — Where the profile of allegations renders the existence of strong suspicion patently absurd or inherently improbable, the accused should be discharged. (Paras 14, 15, 16, 17)

2025 INSC 1373 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH TUHIN KUMAR BISWAS @ BUMBA Vs. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL ( Before : Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh and Manmohan, JJ. )…

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 321 — Withdrawal from prosecution — Requirement of High Court permission for withdrawal of cases against sitting or former MPs/MLAs — Following Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India — High Court must exercise judicial mind and give a reasoned order when considering an application for permission to withdraw prosecution against sitting/former legislators — Application must disclose reasons for withdrawal and records of the case must be before the High Court — Absence of requisite permission from the High Court means that the withdrawal application cannot be granted and the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed on this ground — High Court’s rejection of quashing petition confirmed. (Paras 2, 7, 9, 10)

2025 INSC 1378 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH BAL KUMAR PATEL @ RAJ KUMAR Vs. STATE OF U.P ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ. )…

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Inherent powers of High Court — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings — Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 — Sections 420 (Cheating), 344 (Wrongful confinement for ten or more days), and 506 (Criminal intimidation) — Scope of quashing power: Quashing under Section 482 CrPC must be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and only in exceptional situations; court must avoid delving into disputed facts at the pre-trial stage — Interference is warranted only when the case falls within recognized parameters (like those in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) — Where allegations in FIR and charge sheet, corroborated by witness statements, prima facie disclose essential ingredients of offences under Sections 420, 344, and 506 IPC, quashing is unwarranted. (Paras 12, 18, 20, 23, 25, 30, 32, 34)

2025 INSC 1384 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ROCKY Vs. STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANOTHER ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal No…of…

Service Matters

Service Law — Termination of Contractual Service — Qualifications — Interpretation of Educational Qualifications — Advertisement requiring “Postgraduate degree in Statistics” — Appellant holding M.Com. degree with Business Statistics and Indian Economic Statistics as principal subjects — Where no Government university offers a degree exclusively titled “Postgraduate degree in Statistics,” insisting solely on the title of the degree, without considering the actual curriculum, amounts to elevating form over substance — The interpretation must be contextual and purposive — Termination based solely on the title of the degree, ignoring expert opinion (Director, W.S.O., S.W.M., P.H.E.D.) that the appellant meets the requirement and the University certificate confirming inclusion of Statistics as principal subjects, is arbitrary and unreasonable. (Paras 3, 4, 31, 32, 37, 44)

2025 INSC 1385 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH LAXMIKANT SHARMA Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ. ) Civil…

Contempt of Court — Initiating contempt proceedings — Clear and unequivocal terms of the underlying order — A Contempt Petition can be dismissed summarily only if the underlying order, the non-compliance of which is alleged, is genuinely unclear, ambiguous, or susceptible to two equally reasonable interpretations — Where the High Court dismissed a Contempt Petition holding that the underlying order was capable of two interpretations, but the Supreme Court found, upon reading the order as a whole, that there were clear and categorical directions and recorded statements regarding handing over of possession and payment of compensation, the dismissal of the Contempt Petition was erroneous. (Paras 1, 7, 8, 9, 10)

2025 INSC 1379 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH BHASKAR GOVIND GAVATE (NOW DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS. Vs. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS ( Before : Pamidighantam Sri…

Goods and Services Tax (GST) — Exemption Notification — Notification No. 9/2017- Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 — Entry 13 — Exemption on services by way of renting of residential dwelling for use as residence — Renting residential property as hostel to students/working professionals — Conditions for exemption: renting service, residential dwelling, and use as residence — The term “residential dwelling” is not defined under GST laws but refers to any residential accommodation for long-term stay, excluding commercial places, hotels, guesthouses for temporary stay — Property comprising 42 rooms rented out and sub-leased for use as hostel accommodation is considered a “residential dwelling” as its nature and use remain residential, not commercial accommodation like a hotel. (Paras 36, 46, 47, 50)

2025 INSC 1380 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER Vs. TAGHAR VASUDEVA AMBRISH AND ANOTHER ( Before : J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.…

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 31(7)(a) and (b) — Power of Arbitral Tribunal to grant interest — Party Autonomy — Pre-award (pendente lite) interest — Section 31(7)(a) mandates that the Arbitral Tribunal’s discretion to award interest on the sum awarded (from date cause of action arose till date of award) is subject to the agreement between the parties (“unless otherwise agreed by the parties”) — When parties specify a contractual rate of interest in the agreement, subject to no legal bar, this stipulation takes precedence over the Arbitrator’s discretion to deem a rate “reasonable” — Arbitral Tribunal is bound by the contractual terms regarding interest once agreed upon, and the borrower cannot later challenge the rate as unconscionable or against public policy, especially in commercial transactions between parties of equal bargaining power — Post-award interest is governed by Section 31(7)(b) (Paras 51, 53, 56, 64, 65, 70).

2025 INSC 1380 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH BPL LIMITED Vs. MORGAN SECURITIES AND CREDITS PRIVATE LIMITED ( Before : J.B. Pardiwala and Sandeep Mehta, JJ. ) Civil Appeal…

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 319 — Summoning of Additional Accused — Nature and Scope of Power — The power under Section 319 CrPC is extraordinary and discretionary, intended to be exercised sparingly, but it is an enabling provision aimed at ensuring that no guilty person escapes the process of law — The prerequisite for its exercise is that it must appear from the evidence adduced during inquiry or trial that a person not already arraigned as an accused has committed an offence — The object is to ensure a fair and complete trial and give effect to the maxim ‘judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur’ (Judge is condemned when guilty is acquitted). (Paras 6, 7)

2025 INSC 1386 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH NEERAJ KUMAR @ NEERAJ YADAV Vs. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.…

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 34 and 37 — Arbitral Award — Excepted or Prohibited Claims — Contractual clauses barring certain claims (e.g., for idle labour, idle machinery, business loss) — Judicial review of awards involving prohibited claims — Applicability of such clauses primarily depends on the agreement between the parties, guided by the principle of party autonomy — Arbitral Tribunal and Courts must rely on the contract as the foundation of the legal relationship — High Court setting aside Civil Court order (under Section 34) and restoring award (under Section 37) solely based on precedent (Bharat Drilling) without independent contractual analysis is flawed — Reinstating claims (underutilised overheads, loss due to underutilised tools/machinery, loss of profit) barred by specific contractual provisions (Clauses 4.20.2, 4.20.4) is incorrect if based only on flawed precedent. (Paras 4, 5, 6, 8, 9)

2025 INSC 1388 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH THE STATE OF JHARKHAND Vs. THE INDIAN BUILDERS JAMSHEDPUR ( Before : Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Atul S. Chandurkar, JJ. )…

Stamp Act, 1899 — Section 9A (inserted by Indian Stamp (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1988) — Exemption of Stamp Duty — Cooperative Societies — Transfer of Premises to Members — Jharkhand Self-Supporting Cooperative Societies Act, 1996 — Section 5(7) — Conclusive Evidence — Mandating recommendation from Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Society, as a prerequisite for granting stamp duty exemption under Section 9A is illegal and ultra vires because the certificate of registration issued under Section 5(7) of the 1996 Act is conclusive proof of the society’s existence, rendering the additional requirement superfluous, unnecessary, and based on irrelevant consideration. (Paras 2.2, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15)

2025 INSC 1389 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ADARSH SAHKARI GRIH NIRMAN SWAWLAMBI SOCIETY LTD. Vs. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND AND OTHERS ( Before : Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and…

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